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TAKING TERRORISTS TO COURT: A PRACTICAL
EVALUATION OF CIVIL SUITS AGAINST TERRORISTS
UNDER THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT
The lawsuit seeks damages in excess of $1 trillion.' It is a 259-page
class action suit filed by more than 600 relatives of victims of the September 11th terrorist attacks.2 Among the defendants are seven international
banks; eight Islamicfoundations, charities and their subsidiaries;individual terroristfinanciers; the Saudi bin Laden Group; three Saudi princes;
and the government of Sudan for allegedly bankrolling the terrorist Al
Qaeda network, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban.3 One of the
plaintiffs'
4
lawyers, noted: "This, I think, will be the trialof the century.

I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, terrorists scarred America, literally and
figuratively. The aftermath of September 11 th also profoundly impacted
the American system of justice.5 Enormous government resources were6
funneled toward the investigation and prosecution of terrorist perpetrators.
Moreover, the justice system's response raised serious questions about

See Burnett v. Al Baraka Investment and Dev. Corp., D.D.C., Third Amended
Complaint, 22 Nov. 2002, Civ. Action No. 1:02 CV 01616(JR), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/terrorism/burnettba815O2cmp.pdf (last visited Feb. 28,
2004) [hereinafter Burnett Complaint]; see also Burnett v. Al Baraka Investment and Dev.
Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 91 (D.D.C. 2003) (summarizing nature of complaint). See generally Susan Schmidt, Sept. 11 Families Join to Sue Saudis: Banks, Charitiesand Royals
Accused Of Funding Al Qaeda Terrorist Network, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2002, at A04
(describing Burnett lawsuit).
2 See Burnett Complaint, supra note 1.
3 See id.
4 Schmidt, supra note I at A04.
See generally Stephen P. Waters and Joseph S. Lawder, The Permanent Impact of
September l1th, 59-SEP BENCH & B. MINN. 17 (2002) (discussing overall impact of September IIth on legal system).
6 The United States has deployed more than 60,000 troops around the world to combat terrorism, including 9,000 in Afghanistan alone. Fact Sheet: News About the War
Against Terrorism, WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, Nov. 16, 2002, avail-

able at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02111603.htm. Approximately 650 enemy
combatants are now under U.S. control. Id. Worldwide, approximately 2,290 terroristrelated arrests were made in 99 countries between September 12, 2001 and October 28,
2002. Id.
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government safeguards on fundamental civil rights. Finally, Congress
implemented a comprehensive system to facilitate the process of compensating the many victims of September 11th and their families. 8 The federal
government has thus far played the primary role in both prosecuting perpetrators and providing compensation for victims. 9
As time passes, however, the potential for victims to seek redress on
their own, individually or collectively, through civil suits becomes an increasingly pertinent issue in addressing terrorism in America.' 0 Given the
enormity of the injuries sustained on September 11 th, there is potential for
a myriad of expensive and high-profile civil law suits.' It was for this
very reason that the federal government established the September 1lth
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 ("VCF"). 12 Likewise, the American
Trial Lawyers Association made an unprecedented call for a moratorium
13
on all civil law suits stemming from the incidents of September llth.
Nonetheless, civil suits have already been filed, and more are sure to
come. 14 As one United States District
Judge noted, "there are potentially
'5
thousands and thousands of cases."'
See generally Whitney D. Frazier, The ConstitutionalitV of Detainment in the Wake
of September 11th, 90 Ky. L.J. 1089 (2002) (exploring constitutional implications of response to September 11th): J.Gregory Sidak, The Price of Experience: The Constitution
After September 11, 2001, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 37 (2002) (discussing constitutional issues
associated with September 1Ith): David Cole, Terrorizing Immigrants in the Name of
Fighting Terrorism, 29-WTR HUM. RTS. 11 (2002) (explaining impact of heightened security on immigration); Legal Imnplications of September Eleventh: A Question of Security or
Civil Liberties, 4 SCHOLAR 189 (2002) (discussing civil liberties in light of September 11th).
8 On September 22, 2001, President Bush signed into law the Air Transportation and
System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001). Title IV of the Act is
titled the "September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001" ("VCF"). See 28 C.F.R. §
104 (2002). The purpose of the VCF is "to provide compensation to eligible individuals
who were physically injured as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September
I1,2001, and to the 'personal representatives' of those who were killed as a result of the
crashes." Id. Victims or their survivors can obtain compensation for their losses through a
governmental claims process rather than by filing a lawsuit. See id. See generally Carl
Vogt and Mark Robertson, Compensating Victims of Sept. 11 Terrorist Attacks, N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 30, 2001, at I (outlining provisions of VCF); Georgene Vairo, Remedies for Victims of
Terrorism, 35 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1265, 1273-85 (2002) (discussing VCF as viable option for
compensation of victims of September 11th); Richard P. Campbell, Tort-Model Compensation, 31 -WTR BRIEF 4 (2002) (exploring VCF as model for mass tort compensation).
9 See supra notes 6 and 8 and accompanying discussion.
10 See Richard K. Milin, Suing Terrorists and Their Private and State Supporters,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 2001, at I.
' See id.
12 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
13See Milin, supra note 10. This moratorium was intended to prevent turning "victims against other victims" through suing airlines, insurers, building owners, and even fertilizer manufacturers. Id.
14 See, e.g., Ashton v. Al Qaeda, S.D.N.Y., Complaint, Sep. 3,2002, available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/ashtonalq90302cmp.pdf (last visited Feb. 28,
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One avenue of civil redress is to sue the terrorists themselves. The
idea of initiating a civil cause of action against terrorists, however, is a
relatively new concept, that presents unique legal opportunities and challenges. 16 Under which statutory provisions will plaintiffs seek damages?
What are the obstacles to establishing jurisdiction over all the potential
defendants? Will defendants recognize the jurisdiction of U.S. courts? If
not, will plaintiffs be able to enforce default judgments against terrorist
defendants? Can such lawsuits detract from or bolster official government
efforts to investigate and prosecute terrorists? May the intervention of
"private attorneys general" adversely impact U.S. foreign relations? Will
the immense time and costs imposed on the judicial system in order to adjudicate these claims be worth the uncertain results? Perhaps most important from a victim's standpoint, even if plaintiffs can successfully sue terrorists, will they realize any monetary award? Judging from developing
case law and evolving statutory schemes, the jury is still out.
This note seeks to address these questions by exploring the ability
of victimized U.S. citizens to sue non-state terrorist actors in federal
court. 17 In doing so, Part I1will provide a brief survey of the development
of federal law with respect to civil litigation involving terrorism. Part III
will focus on the primary statutory provision allowing such suits in federal
court, the Anti-Terrorism Act Of 1991,18 and through the few cases
brought under the Act so far, will examine the legal hurdles any private
party faces when bringing suit under it. Part IV will conclude by illuminating some of the potential benefits and challenges posed by the Act and will
focus on the outlook for the future of such litigation.

2004); Burnett Complaint, supra note 1;Jane Doe v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,
S.D.N.Y., Complaint, Oct. II, 2001, 01 CIV. 9074, available at http://www.courttv.coml
assault on america/docs/osamasuitl.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2004). See generallv CBS
Evening
News,
"Making
Terrorists
Pay,"
Feb.
8,
2002,
available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/02/O8/eveningnews/main328828.shtml (last visited

Feb. 28, 2004) (describing complaint in Doe v.The Islamic Emirate).
15 Sarah Sparks & Milo Geyelin, Aftermath: New York's Recoverv: Experts
Offer
Ways to Manage Terror lawsuits, WALL ST.J.,Sep. 25, 2001, at AI0.
16 See Jennifer A. Rosenfeld, The Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Bringing International
Terrorists to Justice the American Way, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. J. 726, 729-31 (1992)
(noting divergent legal standards and lack of legislative framework prior to 1990).
1 Suits involving state-actors will not be addressed herein as the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) governs such suits. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2002). See also inflra note
25 and accompanying text. Non-state actors are all other actors who are not agents of a
foreign state or sanctioned to act under the authority of a foreign state. See generally Jack
Goldsmith and Ryan Goodman, U.S. Civil Litigation and International Terrorism, CHICAGO
PUB. LAW AND LE:GAL THEORY WORKING PAPER No.26 (April 8, 2002) at 2-4, availableat
http://ssrn.com/abstractid=312451 (last visited Mar. 16, 2004) (distinguishing "FSIA state
actors," "non-FSIA state actors." and "pure non-state actors.") Al Qaeda, for instance,
would fit under this category.
I' 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2002).
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II. A CIVIL REMEDY FOR TERRORISM?
Within the past decade, Congress has enacted a number of statutes
governing civil suits against terrorists and terrorist organizations, including
the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991 ("ATA"),1 9 the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 20 the Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991 ("TVPA"), 21 and an amendment to the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").22 While these statutes vary in
their scope and applicability, they serve two basic goals: to compensate
victims of terrorism and to deter future wrongful acts by terrorists and their
sponsors. 23
For decades, families of terrorism victims have repeatedly attempted to seek civil redress against terrorists, but until recently had been
thwarted by the principle of sovereign immunity. 24 In 1976, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), which opened the
door to civil suits against foreign states and their agents.25 However, the
United States Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control
("OFAC"), which oversees the seizure of foreign assets, effectively limited
26
civil recovery against foreign state assets in the interest of foreign affairs.
Then, in 1991, Congress enacted the ATA, which provides for a direct civil
cause of action for United States nationals injured by an act of international
terrorism perpetrated by private parties. 27 In that same year, Congress also
19 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2002). The ATA was originally enacted in 1990, repealed in

1991 due to a technical error, and re-enacted in 1992. See Federal Courts Administration
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, §1003, 106 Stat. 4506, 4521 (1992) (entitled "Terrorism
Civil Remedy").
20 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2002).
21 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (2002).
22 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2002) (as amended by Patriot Act, Sec. 813).
23 See generally Walter W. Heiser, Civil Litigation As a Means of Compensating
Victims of International Terrorism, 3 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 1, 3 (2002) (exploring objectives, benefits and drawbacks of civil suits against terrorists); Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at
728 (explaining twin objectives of attacking financial apparatus of terrorism).
24 See generally Rudolph Lehrer, Unbalancing the Terrorists' Checkbook: Analysis
of U.S. Policy in Its Economic War on InternationalTerrorism, 10 TUL. J.INT'L & CoMP. L.
333 (2002) (discussing impact of OFAC on civil recovery attempts under FSIA).
2' 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2002). The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) provides a comprehensive scheme for civil suits against foreign states. Id. FSIA defines a
"foreign state" as a "political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state." Id. In Flatlow v.Islamic Republic of Iran, the court applied the FSIA
rules to a suit against the State of Iran, the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security,
Ayatollah Khamenei, and other state actors. 999 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1998).
26 See generally Lehrer, supra note 24.
" 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2002). Although the ATA focused on acts of "international
terrorism," the act's definition of international terrorism includes acts transcending national
boundaries "in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear
intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek
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passed the TVPA, which created a cause of action against foreign governmental actors for acts of torture and extrajudicial killings. 28 Later, in 1996,
Congress enacted the AEDPA, which amended the FSIA to allow suits
against foreign governments that support terrorism. 29
The AEDPA
stripped foreign states and officials of their sovereign immunity in personal

injury cases involving "torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources (as defined in
[the ATA])."3 ° Together these laws form the basis for federal jurisdiction
over civil suits involving terrorism.' Each, however, has its own requirements and limitations depending on the parties suing and the parties to be
sued. 32 The primary statute governing civil suits against non-state terrorists, which will be focused on herein, is the ATA.
III. THE ANTITERRORISM ACT

Congress enacted the ATA to enable victims of international terrorism to seize assets and recover damages from terrorists within jurisdic33
tional reach.
The ATA defines international terrorism as criminal acts
that seek to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence governmental policy, or to affect governmental conduct. 34 It also provides the
asylum." 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2002).
2"Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
29 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(7) (2002).
30 28 U.S.C, § 1605(a)(7) (2002).
See also Milin, supra note 10. Congress later
adopted the "Flatlow Amendment" to the AEDPA, which created a federal cause of action
against state actors supporting terrorism and allowed recovery for pain and suffering and
punitive damages. See id.
31 See Goldsmith & Goodman, supra note 17, at 8-16 (summarizing governing law
over civil suits against non-FSIA defendants sued for action of terrorism).

32 See id.
33 See Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 737 (discussing legislative intent behind passage

of ATA); see also The Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2465 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice, Senate Judiciary Comm., 101 st
Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1990). Senator Grassley, co-sponsor of the original bill, stated that
the ATA "empowers victims with all the weapons available in civil litigation." 137 CONG.
REC. S4511-04, S4511 (daily ed. April 16, 1991) (statement of Sen. Grassley). Moreover
the legislative history indicates that the statute "opens the courthouse door to victims of

international terrorism." Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, S. Rep. No. 342, at
45 (1992), available at 1992 WL 187372.
31 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2002). The ATA provides in relevant part that international
terrorism consists of any activities that:

(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
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most direct path for citizens to sue non-state terrorists for damages in federal court by explicitly conferring new
extraterritorial jurisdiction upon the
35
federal courts in these civil actions.
Although the ATA has been in effect for nearly a decade, it remains
virtually untested in the federal courts. -36 Moreover, the statutory provision
for civil liability under the ATA consumes no more than a few short paragraphs in the United States Code.37 Some important questions of statutory
and judicial interpretation must, therefore, be considered when a potential
plaintiff contemplates bringing suit under the ATA. The general questions
that will be addressed below are: (1) how to establish jurisdiction over a
defendant; (2) who can be held liable and for what actions; (3) what damages are recoverable and who can recover them.
Notwithstanding the limited judicial treatment of the ATA, the
courts have more recently addressed some of these important questions. In
2002, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
38
heard Boin v. Quranic Literacy Institute. In Boim, the court addressed
the unsettled issue of whether individuals or organizations could be held39
liable under the ATA for providing financial support to terrorist groups.
The court held that victims of acts of international terrorism could sue
groups who knowingly channel money to terrorists. 40 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit explored various theories of liability under which a plaintiff

(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or
kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished,
and the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in
which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
Id.
" See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2002). The Act provides in relevant part:
(a) Action and jurisdiction.-Any national of the United States injured in his or
her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or
his or her estate, survivors, or heirs may sue therefore in any appropriate district
court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees.
Id.; see also Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 740 (explaining new jurisdiction conferred on
courts).
'6 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2333 (West 2003) (citing only two cases interpreting § 2333 in
the annotations); see also Milin, supra note 10 (explaining fact that ATA remains untested
in the courts). Prior to 2002, only two published opinions explored its scope. See Boim v.
Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (N.D. II1.
2001); Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 153 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.R.I. 2001).
18 U.S.C. §§ 2331, 2333, 2334 (2002).
3'291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002).
17

39See id. at 1007.
4"See id. at 1028.
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might bring a suit under the ATA.4 ' In 2003, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, in Smith v. Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan, became the first court to render a judgment in a suit
brought against the September 11 th terrorists under the ATA. 2 Although a
default judgment was rendered in the case, the court did address the fundamental question of whether the attacks committed within United States
borders were considered acts of international terrorism. 43 Finally, the
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, in Estates of
Ungar v. PalestinianAuthority, recently addressed questions with respect
to the jurisdictional reach of the ATA and the qualification of "survivors"
and "heirs" under the Act. 44 Together the rulings in these three recent decisions can provide guidance to those seeking to bring suit under the ATA.
A.

The JurisdictionalReach of the ATA

As with any other federal cause of action, in an action brought pursuant to the ATA, the court must have both subject matter and personal
jurisdiction over the parties in order to enter a default judgment.4 5 The
language of the ATA explicitly provides that "[any national of the United
States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act
of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs may sue
therefore in any appropriate district court of the United States..."'46 In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 2338 provides that the "district courts of the United
States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over an action brought under this
chapter., 47 The ATA clearly makes civil suits against terrorists a federal
question under the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district
courts 48
.
Obtaining personal jurisdiction over the parties to a suit brought under the act, however, can be more difficult. Two interrelated elements
must be satisfied in order to establish personal jurisdiction over a party to a
suit brought under the statute: 1) minimum contacts with the United States
49
and 2) effective service of process.
41 See id. at 1008-1009 (laying out plaintiffs' three theories of liability under § 2333).
42

262 F. Supp. 2d 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

43 See id. at 220-221 (holding facts fall within statute's definition of "international

terrorism").
44 2004 WL 134034 (D.R.I. Jan. 27, 2004).
45 See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *10 (citing extensive authority that subject matter
and personal jurisdiction must be established before entering default judgment).
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2002).
41 18 U.S.C. § 2338 (2002).
48 See Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 85-86 (2001)
46

(affirming federal jurisdiction over claim brought pursuant to § 2333).
49 See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *11. Judge Lageux aptly explained the two-fold
burden upon the plaintiff to establish personal jurisdiction in suits such as those brought
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In Ungar, the United States District Court for the District of Rhode
Island addressed the challenge of establishing personal jurisdiction over
defendants in a civil action brought pursuant to the ATA.50 In 1996,
United States citizen Yaron Ungar ("Ungar"), his wife, Efrat, and their
nine-month-old son, were traveling home from a wedding in Israel when
Hamas members in another vehicle opened fire on the Ungars' car, killing
Ungar and his wife.5 '
The administrator of the Ungars' estates filed an
action pursuant to Section 2333 on behalf of the estates.52 The defendants
named in the lawsuit were divided into two groups: the Palestinian Authority ("PA") defendants 53 and the Hamas defendants. 54 The complaint
alleged that all defendants engaged in acts of international terrorism as
defined in Sections 2331 and 2333 because their actions: (1) were dangerous to human life and were violations of the criminal laws of the United
States; (2) appeared to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, or to influence the policy of a government by means of intimidation
or coercion; and (3) occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.
Notwithstanding two unsuccessful motions by the PA
defendants to dismiss the complaint, the primary claim against the PA and
PLO-the alleged violation of Section 2333-is still pending before the
court. 56 With respect to the Hamas defendants, the plaintiffs filed an Apunder the ATA:

In a federal question case, the starting point of this Court's minimum contacts
analysis is the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.... The relevant inquiry under such circumstances is whether the defendant has minimum contacts
with the United States as a whole, rather than whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the particular state in which the federal court sits.... [T]he
plaintiff must also establish that service of process is authorized by a federal statute or rule.
Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 86-87.
50 See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *11 -*22 (analyzing whether plaintiff made prima

facie showing of personal jurisdiction over defendants).
51 Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 82-83.
52 See id. at 83.
5- This group included: the Palestinian Authority (PA); the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO); Yasser Arafat ("Arafat"), President of defendant PA and Chairman of
defendant PLO; Jibril Rajoub ("Rajoub") and Muhammed Dahlan ("Dahlan"), who com-

manded and controlled the Palestinian Preventive Security Services; Amin AI-Hindi ("AlHindi") and Tawfik Tirawi ("Tirawi"), who commanded and controlled the Palestinian
General Intelligence Services; and Razi Jabali ("Jabali"), who commanded and controlled
the Palestinian Police. See id. at 84.
14 This group included Hamas, as well as the individual operatives of Hamas responsible for the shooting attack that killed Yaron and Efrat Ungar: Rahman Ghanimat, Hor,
Abu Hamdiya, Kafishe, and Ibrahim Ghanimat. See id.
.5 Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 84; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331, 2333, supra
notes 34

and 35.

56 Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 228 F. Supp. 2d 40 (2002). On June 15, 2000, the
PA defendants filed a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
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plication for Entry of Default against them. 57 The clerk entered the default
and the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Enter Default Judgment against the
Hamas defendants.5 8 The District Court referred the motion to a magistrate
judge for preliminary review, findings and recommended disposition.59
On July 3, 2003, a magistrate judge recommended that the court grant the
plaintiffs' motion with respect to defendant Hamas, but deny the motion as
to the remainder of the Hamas defendants and dismiss the claims against
them for lack of personal jurisdiction. 60 Against Hamas itself, the court
recommended awarding the plaintiffs damages of approximately $116 million, plus interest, attorney's fees and CoStS. 6 1 On January 27, 2004, the
District Court adopted the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, except with regard to prejudgment interest,
and ordered a final judg62
ment against Hamas in accordance with it.
In its decision recommending the default judgment against Hamas,
the court addressed at length many issues under the ATA including jurisdictional requirements, sufficiency of service, qualification as a survivor,
and proper measures of damages.63 In determining whether the court had
personal jurisdiction over Hamas, the court noted that Hamas must have
had minimum contacts with the United States as a whole and that Hamas
dure to dismiss the complaint against them on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, lack of jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency of service of process,
improper venue, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and inconvenience of the forum. See Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 84. On July 24, 2001, the court denied
the PA defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; granted the
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as to the individual PA defendants, but
denied the motion as to defendants PA and PLO; denied the motion to dismiss for improper
venue; denied the motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process; denied the motion to
dismiss on Count I,the alleged violation of Section 2333; granted the motion to dismiss on
all of the other common law claims because the plaintiffs failed to plead those claims under
Israeli law as required by Rhode Island's choice of law rules; and denied the motion to
dismiss for inconvenience of the forum. See id. at 100. On August 23, 2001, the plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint realleging Count I and pleading all common law claims pursuant to the Israeli Civil Wrongs Ordinances. See Ungar, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 42. On November 28, 2001, the PA and PLO moved again to dismiss the complaint as non-justiciable and
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See id. at 43. On November 4,
2002, the court denied all the defendants' motions. See id. at 51.
57 Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *10.
58 Id.

59Id. The District Court referred the motion to United States Magistrate Judge David
Martin pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B) and Local Rule 32(a). Id.
60 Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *39. The court recommended a denial of the Motion
to Enter Default Judgment against defendants Rahman Ghanimat, Tzabich Al Hor, Abu
Hamdiya, Ibrahim Ghanimat, and Hassan Fuad Kafishe. Id.
61 m

62 Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *9. The District Court explained that awarding
pre-

judgment interest on what the trebling provision rendered a largely punitive damages award
was inappropriate. See id. at *5-*6.
63 See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *10 -*38.
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must have been properly served with process in any district where it was
found or had an agent./4
The court relied on the following facts to hold that there was "more
than enough evidence to find that Hamas has minimum contacts with the
United States": 1) an admitted leader of the political wing of Hamas, Abu
Marzook, resided in the United States until 1993; 2) Hamas used United
States banks to deposit and transfer funds to Hamas members and Hamas
related organizations in the United States and abroad; 3) the admitted head
of the military wing of Hamas, Muhammed Salah ("Salah"), had engaged
in activity on behalf of Hamas both in the United States and abroad; 4)
Salah used the Quranic Literacy Institute ("QLI") of Oak Lawn, Illinois, as
a means for furthering his activities in the United States; 5) real estate that
QLI purchased was used to support Salah's Hamas-related activities; and
6) an expert who had researched and investigated the activities of Middle
Eastern terrorist organizations operating in the United States for 13 years
affirmed the pervasive activities of Hamas in the United States since the
late 1980s. '
In determining whether service was sufficient, the court looked to
Rule 4(h)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for
service on a foreign or domestic corporation or unincorporated association
by serving an "officer" and/or "managing or general agent" of the corporation or association. 66 The court ruled that Hamas qualified as an unincorporated association because "[ilt is composed of individuals, without a
6 See i. at *13.
The court relied upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(l)(D),
which provides that service of a summons is effective to establish jurisdiction over the
person of a defendant "when authorized by a statute of the United States." FED. R. Civ. P.
4(k)( I )(D). The ATA provides that "[pirocess in [a civil action brought under section 2333
of this title] may be served in any district where the defendant resides, is found, or has an
agent." 18 U.S.C. § 2334(a) (2002).
6' Ungar. 2004 WL 134034, at * 13-*20.
66See id.at *20. Rule 4(h)(1 ) provides in pertinent part:

(h) Service Upon Corporations and Associations.
Unless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon a domestic or foreign
corporation or upon a partnership or other unincorporated association that is subjcct to suit under a common name, and from which a waiver of service has not
been obtained and filed, shall be effected:
(I) in a judicial district of the United States in the manner prescribed for individuals by subdivision (e)( 1),
or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized
by appointment or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a
copy to the defendant, or
(2) in a place not within any judicial district of the United States in any manner
prescribed for individuals by subdivision (f) except personal delivery as provided
in paragraph (2)(C)(i) thereof.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(hi.
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legal identity apart from its membership, formed for specific objectives."6 7
Because the court considered Hamas to be an unincorporated association, it
held that service had been properly effectuated by serving Salah, the admitted head of Hamas' military wing, at his home in Illinois. 68 The court relied on extensive evidence of Salah's pervasive role in Hamas of directing
military operations, receiving direct orders from Marzook, the political
leader of Hamas, and distributing hundreds of thousands of dollars to
Hamas operatives. 69 The court further noted that based on Salah's level in
the Hamas hierarchy, it was reasonable to conclude that he had the authority to exercise independent judgment and discretion in carrying out his
duties.7°

Explaining that the plaintiffs had satisfied the minimum contacts
and service of process requirements, the court affirmed its personal jurisdiction over Hamas. 7' With respect to the individual Hamas defendants,
however, the court reaffirmed the reasoning applied earlier in the litigation
with respect to the individual PA defendants, and summarily dismissed the
claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction.7 2 The court explained
that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the individual Hamas defendants
engaged in the "kind of systematic and continuous activity in the United
States necessary
to support the exercise of general personal jurisdiction
73
over them.

67 Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *20 (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro
Ed.
739 F.Supp 854, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)). In deciding that Hamas qualified as an unincorporated association, the court relied upon the following definition laid out in Motta v.Samuel
Weiser, Inc.: "An unincorporated association is defined as a body of persons acting together and using certain methods for prosecuting a special purpose or common enterprise."
Id. (quoting Motta v. Samuel Weiser, Inc., 768 F.2d 481, 485 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY Ill (5th ed. 1979)).
6" See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *20-*21. The court explained that in a federal
question case, federal law determines whether a person is an agent for purposes of service
under Rule 4. See id. at *20 (citing Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 89-90). The court cited
federal case law indicating that a general or managing agent is an individual with the authority to exercise independent judgment and discretion in the performance of his or her
duties. See id.
69 See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034,
at *21.
70 See id.
7'See id.
72 See id. at *22. Earlier in the litigation, Judge Lagueux distinguished the due process analysis appropriate under the ATA versus that under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) on which the plaintiffs relied. See Ungar, 153 F.
Supp. at 93-95. The court required the plaintiffs demonstrate that the defendants had sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy traditional due process analysis rather than applying the
more lenient analysis, according to which the court inquires whether the defendants' acts
were sufficient to provide them with fair warning that the effects of their actions in a foreign country
may2004
subject
to the
of the courts of that country. See i.
73 Ungar,
WL them
134034,
at jurisdiction
*22.
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In other situations, the potential terrorist defendants, unlike Hamas,
may not be as well known or as easily located for service.74 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York addressed the
difficulties of establishing personal jurisdiction over defendants in suits
brought under the ATA. 5 In Smith, the court adjudicated a claim that the
survivors of two victims of the September 11th terrorist attacks brought
against the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Taliban, Al Qaeda, Osama
bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, and the Republic of Iraq. 76 The court agreed
with the plaintiffs that because none of the defendants could be found in
the United States, Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gov77
Rule 4(f) outlines various methods to be emerned service upon them.
74 See, e.g., Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 2001 WL 1658211, *2-3

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2001) (discussing difficulties inherent in service of process on Osama
bin Laden, Al Qaeda, & the Taliban).
75 See id. (noting bin Laden and Al Qaeda not amenable by prescribed methods under
Rule 4).
76 See Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). On November 14, 2001, Raymond Smith, the administrator of the estate of his
brother, George Smith, brought suit against the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Taliban,
Al Qaeda, and Osama bin Laden for damages stemming from George's death during the
September 11th attacks. See id. at 220. On November 15, 2001, Jane Doe, executrix of the
estate of Timothy Soulas, who was also killed on September 11 th, brought a separate suit
against the same defendants. See id. The court consolidated the two cases on January 23,
2003. See id. With the court's permission, the plaintiffs amended the consolidated complaint on June 10, 2002, to add Saddam Hussein and the Republic of Iraq as defendants.
See id.
77 See Smith, 2001 WL 1658211, at *1. Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part:
Unless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon an individual from whom
a waiver has not been obtained and filed, other than an infant or an incompetent
person, may be effected in a place not within any judicial district of the United
States:
(1) by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to give notice,
such as those means authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents; or
(2) if there is no internationally agreed means of service or the applicable international agreement allows other means of service, provided that service is reasonably calculated to give notice:
(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that
country in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or
(B) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory or letter of
request; or
(C) unless prohibited by the law of the foreign country, by
(i) delivery to the individual personally of a copy of the summons and the
complaint; or
(ii) any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served; or
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ployed for foreign service, and allows for alternative means of service to
be directed by the court if the outlined procedures would not be effective.78
Explaining that any of the established methods for service would likely be
futile in attempting to serve Osama bin Laden, the court ordered service by
publication in various Arab media outlets.79 With respect to Al Qaeda, the
court found it to be an unincorporated association pursuant to Rule 4(h) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 80 As such, Al Qaeda could be served
in any manner provided in Rule 4(f).81 The court explained that Al Qaeda
was no more amenable to service than bin Laden and, therefore, ordered
service by publication in the same manner as with bin Laden. 82 Finally,
with respect to the Taliban, the court relied on the same analysis under
Rule 4(h) as it applied to Al Qaeda, but noted that the plaintiffs were capable of effectuating personal service on a hifh-ranking member of the Taliban because it still had a visible presence. Pursuant to Rules 4(h)(2) and
4(f)(3), the court, therefore, ordered that the plaintiffs personally serve
Ambassador Abdul Salaam Zaeef rather than serve the Taliban by publication.84
Together Ungar and Smith highlight the challenges of establishing
personal jurisdiction over the parties that tend to be defendants in suits
brought under the ATA. 85 They are also instructive to those considering
bringing suit under the ATA as to the parties upon which they may want to
strategically focus. Terrorism, by its very nature, involves covert and informal networks that often cross national borders. Establishing contacts
with the United States, especially with respect to individual terrorists, can
therefore be challenging. Courts will be more likely to find that known
terrorist organizations with extensive international networks reaching the

(3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement as may be directed
by the court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
78

See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f), supra note 77.

79 See Smith, 2001 WL 1658211, at *3.The court ordered service to be made by
publication for six (6) weeks in the following media outlets: Afghani newspapers Hewad,
Anis, Kabul News, and Kabul Times; (2) Pakistani newspaper Wahat; and (3) broadcasters
Al Jazeera, Turkish CNN, BBC World, ARN. and ADF. See id.
80 See id. at *4; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 4(h) supra note 66.
81 See Smith, 2001 WL 1658211, at *4; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 4(h) supra note 66.
Rule 4(h) provides that service upon a corporation or association not within any judicial
district of the United States may be made "inany manner prescribed for individuals by
subdivision (f)except personal delivery as provided in paragraph (2)(C)(i) thereof." FED.
R. Civ. P. 4(h)(2).
82 See Smith, 2001 WL 1658211, at *4.
83

See Smith, 2001 WL 1658211, at *4.The court reasoned that, when practicable,

personal service is preferable to service by publication. See id.
84 See id. at *4 -*5.
85 See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034; Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217.
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United States have sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due process requirements. 86 When practicable, courts will also favor personal service
upon officers or agents of terrorist associations rather than general service
by publication. 87 While the primary individual perpetrators of a terrorist
act may seem to be the most culpable parties, any time a broader organization with which terrorists are associated can be causally linked to an act of
terrorism, targeting such organizations may provide better opportunity to
surmount the hurdle of establishing personal jurisdiction. This strategy of
targeting an organization promoting or supporting terrorism for jurisdictional purposes naturally leads to the question of how broad the net of liability under the ATA can be cast.
B.

Liable PartiesUnder the ATA

1. Defining "International Terrorism"
In Smith, the court held that the facts of the case were sufficient to
allege an international act of terrorism under the ATA. 88 Because none of
the defendants appeared, the court granted a default judgment on December 23, 2002. 89 In its ruling, the court addressed the central issue of
whether the events of September 11 th fall within the ATA's definition of
"international terrorism.' '9 As the court noted, the ATA defines "interna86

See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at * 13-*20.

See Smith, 2001 WL 1658211, at *4; see also discussion of FED. R. Civ. P. 4(h)
supra note 81.
88 See Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 221-22. Because the class of defendants encom17

passed both state actors ("Iraqi Defendants") and non-state actors ("Al Qaeda Defendants"),
the court separated the two classes of defendants and analyzed the claim against the Iraqi
Defendants under the FSIA and the Al Qaeda Defendants under the ATA. See id. at 22232. This note focuses only on the analysis of the claims against the Al Qaeda Defendants
under the ATA.
89 See id. at 220. The court rendered default judgments against all defendants except
Saddam Hussein on December 23, 2002 and then against Saddam Hussein on February 21,
2003. See id. Once a valid cause of action was brought against the Al Qaeda Defendants,
their failure to appear concluded the liability phase and only a determination of damages
remained. See id.; see also Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir.
1981) (when defendant fails to defend, court should accept as true all factual allegations of complaint, except those relating to damages). Nonetheless, the plaintiffs
presented evidence of Osama bin Laden's involvement in terrorism in general and in the
terrorist attacks of September 1 th. See Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 222. The plaintiffs provided evidence including a videotape in which bin Laden told a cleric how he planned to
destroy the World Trade Center; reference to bin Laden'sfatwah, or holy war, of February
23, 1998, against the United States; and general evidence of other acts of terrorism against
the United States linked or attributed to bin Laden. See id.
90 See Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d. at 221-22. The court recognized Bohn as the seminal
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tional terrorism" in contrast to "domestic terrorism." 9' The primary difference is that domestic terrorism involves acts that "occur primarily
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States," while international
terrorism involves acts that "occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend[s] national boundaries in terms of
the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators
operate or seek asylum., 92 The court explained that while the acts of September 11th clearly "occurred primarily" in the United States, acts of international terrorism also encompass acts that "transcend national boundaries
in terms of the means by which they are accomplished ... or the locale in
which their perpetrators operate., 93 The court noted that this broad provision arguably includes the terrorist acts of September 11th, which were
carried out by foreign nationals who apparently received their orders and
funding and some training from foreign sources. 94 Although wary that an
expansive interpretation of the term "international terrorism" could render
the term "domestic terrorism" superfluous, the court held that facts before
case interpreting the ATA, but explained that the decision was generally unhelpful on this
issue because the terrorist acts in Boim clearly fell within the definition of "international
terrorism." See id. at 222 n. 4.
9' See Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 222. The definitions of the two terms are as follows:
(1) the term "international terrorism" means activities that(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping;
(C) and occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or
transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in
which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum...
(5) the term "domestic terrorism" means activities that-(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws
of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2002).
92 Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 222.
13 Id. at221.
94 See id.
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it fell within the statute's definition of "international terrorism" and that
the plaintiffs pled a valid cause of action against the Al Qaeda defendants.95

The Smith court dealt with a situation that prior to September 1 th
may not have been seriously considered-U.S. citizens were victims of
international terrorism within the United States. 96 In subjecting the September 11 th perpetrators to liability, the court logically extended a remedy
for international terrorism targeted at U.S. citizens to follow its new path
into the physical boundaries of the United States.97
2. Aiding and Abetting International Terrorism
The courts also recently addressed the breadth of the concept of an
"act of international terrorism." In Boim, 98 the parents of an American
student murdered in Israel by Hamas 99 terrorists while studying at a yeshiva invoked the ATA to sue several individuals and organizations for the
death of their son."" Among the defendants named in the suit filed in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois were the
Quranic Literacy Institute'0 ' ("QLI") and the Holy Land Foundation for
Relief and Development ("HLF"). 102 The Boims alleged that QLI and HLF
"aided, abetted and financed" the terrorists who actually murdered David
9' See id.
96 See Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at
220.
97

See id. at 222.
F.3d at 100 1.

9' 291

99 Hamas is an extremist Palestinian militant organization whose mission is to establish a fundamentalist Palestinian state. See id. at 1002. It has military and political branches;
and the military branch receives orders and material support from the political branch. See
id. Hamas also allegedly has command and control centers in the United States, Britain,
and other Western European countries that help to coordinate fund-raising efforts aimed at
sympathizers and then to launder and channel the money to Hamas operatives in Gaza and
the West Bank. See id. Hamas was designated a terrorist organization in 1995 by executive
order of the President. Exec. Order No. 12947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995). In 1997,
the Secretary of State designated Hamas as a "foreign terrorist organization" pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1189.
'O See Boin, 291 F.3d at 1001. The Boims brought survivor and wrongful death
actions seeking $100 million in compensatory damages and $100 million in punitive damages. See id. at 1004.
101The Quranic Literacy Institute ("QLr') is an Illinois nonprofit organization that
purports to translate and publish sacred texts. See Boim, 291 F.3d at 1003. QLI employed
Mohammed Abdul Hamid Khalil Salah, another defendant in the case, as a computer analyst. Id. Salah is the admitted United States based leader of the military branch of Hamas.
Id. Salah has been prosecuted for channeling money to Hamas and training terrorist operatives in Israel. Id. He is named on OFAC's list of Specially Designated Terrorists. Id.
102 The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development ("HLF") is a non-profit
organization with offices in Texas and Illinois whose stated mission is to fund humanitarian
relief and development efforts. See Boim, 291 F.3d at 1003. HLF's director has admitted
providing funds to support Hamas. Id.
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Boim. °3 QLI and HLF moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.'04 The district court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss and the defendants appealed. 05
On appeal the Seventh Circuit addressed the following three issues:
1) whether funding of an international terrorist organization in itself constitutes an act of international terrorism under the ATA because it "involves
violent act or acts dangerous to human life"; 2) whether the ATA incorporates the definition of international terrorism adopted in the federal statute
criminalizing international terrorism, which includes material support of
terrorist activities; and 3) whether a cause of action lies for aiding and
abetting international terrorism.106
With respect to the first issue, the Seventh Circuit held that "funding simpliciter" of a terrorist organization is not itself an act of international terrorism and, therefore, is not sufficient alone to establish liability
under the ATA. 10 7 The Boims argued that the provision of funds to a
known terrorist group was an action that itself constituted international
terrorism because it "involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human
life." 0 8 They urged a broad interpretation of the term "involves" as encompassing any activity related to or supporting a violent act.1°9 The defendants, however, argued that the court should interpret the statutory language as applying only to those who actually commit the violent acts."10
The court refused to adopt the Boims' broad interpretation of the language,
explaining that Congress intended to incorporate traditional principles of
tort law into the ATA, including the requirements of intent and proximate
cause."' The court reasoned that failure to require proof of intent and

103 Boim, 291 F.3d at 1004. The Boims argue that QLI and HLF provided "material

support or resources" to Hamas as defined and prohibited in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and
2339B. See id.
104 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1011 (N.D. I11.
2001). QLI
and HLF argued that the ATA does not include an aiding and abetting action, expressed or
implied See id.
5 See id. at 1015-16 (holding Congress intended liability to extend to those providing
material support to terrorists).
'06 See Boim, 291 F.3d at 1007 (listing issues certified for appeal).
107 Id. at 1012.
108 Id. at 1009. The ATA's definition of "international terrorism" includes any activities that "involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State." 18 U.S.C. § 233 (1)
(2002).
'09See Boim, 291 F.3d at 1009.
"10 See id.

1 See id. at 1010 (citing congressional record supporting adoption of general principles of tort law).
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proximate cause would render the standard for liability under' the
ATA too
12
"
reach."
unlimited
almost
"an
statute
the
give
would
and
vague
On the second issue, the court held that the defendants' actions were
violations of criminal provisions prohibiting the provision of material support or resources to a terrorist organization and therefore gave rise to civil
liability under the ATA.1 3 The plaintiffs argued that the defendants' violations of the criminal counterpart to the provisions of the ATA gave rise
to civil liability as well. 1 4 The Seventh Circuit agreed, explaining that it
would be "counterintuitive" to assume that Congress intended to impose
criminal liability but not civil liability on those who finance terrorism."5
The court also clarified that criminal liability under these provisions would
be sufficient, but not necessary, to establish civil liability for financially
supporting terrorism. 116
Finally, the court held in favor of the Boims on their third theory
that aiding and abetting an act of terrorism gives rise to civil liability under
the ATA."17 The plaintiffs contended that aiding and abetting violent acts
is conduct that "involves violent acts" according to the ATA's definition of
terrorism.'"' The defendants argued that aiding and abetting liability is
112 See Boin, 291 F.3d at 1011. The court cautioned that failure to require knowledge

of and intent to further violent terrorist acts might lead to constitutional infirmities under the
First Amendment by punishing persons for mere association with terrorist groups. See id.
The court also noted that the ATA requires a plaintiff be injured "by reason of' an act of
international terrorism and that the Supreme Court has interpreted identical language to
require a showing of proximate cause. See id. (citing Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265-68 (1992)). The court concluded that to hold the defendants
liable for donating money without the knowledge of the intended criminal use would be to
impose strict liability for contributing to terrorist groups, a proposition which the language
or history of the statute does not support. See id. at 1012.
113See Boim, 291 F.3d at 1015. According to 18 U.S.C. § 2339(A) intentionally or
knowingly providing material support or resources to terrorists is a crime. See 18 U.S.C. §
2339(A) (2002). "Material support or resources" is defined as "currency or other financial
securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials."
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (2002). 18 U.S.C. § 2339B extends criminal liability to anyone
providing material support or resources to organizations the Secretary of State designates as
"foreign terrorist organizations" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1189. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2002).
114See Boim, 291 F.3d at 1012. The plaintiffs reasoned that the enactment of the
criminal provisions in § 2339A and § 2339B demonstrate Congress' intent to include the
provision of material support to terrorists in the definition of international terrorism under
the ATA. See id.
" See id. at 1014. The court did not find that the criminal violations themselves give
rise to civil liability. See id. at 1016. Rather, the court explained the fact that Congress
made it a crime to provide material support for terrorism shows Congress logically must
have intended that such actions also give rise to civil liability. See id.
116See Boim, 291 F.3d at 1015.
117 See id. at 1021.

...See id. at 1016.
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available only when expressly provided for in the statute.' 19 The court
disagreed, explaining that though the words "aid and abet" do not appear in
the statute, Congress intended
to extend liability to all points along the
20
causal chain of terrorism.
If other jurisdictions follow the Ninth Circuit's lead in recognizing a
right of action for aiding and abetting terrorism, the Boim decision vastly
expands the potential for a new class of litigants to recover damages under
the ATA. 121 As a practical matter, similar application of the ATA in other
cases expands the potential for victims to find defendants over whom the
courts' will have jurisdiction and against whom they may be able to obtain
enforceable monetary judgments. However, it is especially true in these
types of cases-where terrorist defendants are understandably hesitant to
appear in court and defend themselves and are therefore often defaultedthat establishing liability is not the same as effectuating recovery.
C.

Recovery Under the A TA

1. Damages Recoverable
As noted above, Section 2333(a) allows the estate of a U.S. national
killed by an act of international terrorism and his or her survivors or heirs
to recover threefold the damages they sustain and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees. 22 The two primary questions that confront courts
under this provision of the ATA are: 1) What damages are recoverable?
and 2) Who can recover them? Because there have been very few judgments rendered under the ATA, few courts have interpreted this damages
clause, and those that have done so have adopted different approaches. 123
19 See id. The defendants relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank

of Denver N.A. v. First InterstateBank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), under which
the Court held that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. See id.
121)See Boim, 291 F.3d at 1019-20. The court held that the Central Bank analysis was
not determinative because: 1) Central Bank addresses an implied right of action rather than
an expressed right of action; 2) Congress expressed an intent to employ general tort principles, which include aiding and abetting; 3) criminal liability attached to aiders and abettors
and Congress intend to make civil liability at least as extensive as criminal liability; and 4)
failing to extend aider and abettor liability would not serve Congress' stated goal of cutting
off the flow of money to terrorists. See id. at 1019.
121 See Case Comment, Tort Law-Civil Remedy for Terrorism-Seventh Circuit Recognizes Implied Action for Aiding and Abetting Terrorism.-Boim v. Quranic Literacy

Institute, 116 HARV. L. REV. 713, 716 (2002) (explaining impact of Boim decision); Lehrer,
supra note 24, at 358 (noting prior to 7th Circuit's decision that Boim "could prove to be a
watershed case").
122 See 28 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2002) and statutory language supranote 35.
121 Compare Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d. at 232-40 (analyzing damages in terms of pecu-
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In Smith, after declaring default judgments against the defendants,
the court ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages against both Al
Qaeda under the ATA and the Republic of Iraq pursuant to FSIA and, accordingly, calculated the damages attributable to each defendant. 24 The
court explained that, pursuant to the ATA, Al Qaeda was liable for damages for economic losses and pain and suffering attributable to Smith's and
Soulas' wrongful deaths, as well as treble damages as provided for under
the statute. 125 The court refused, however, to award punitive damages to
either estate, explaining that the ATA fails to provide for punitive damages.126 Moreover, the court distinguished the Al Qaeda defendants' liability from that of the Republic of Iraq. 27 Because Iraq's liability was based
on the FSIA, which allows for damages for economic losses, pain and suffering, and loss of solatium, but not for treble damages, the court held the
Republic of Iraq jointly and severally liable for economic losses and pain
and suffering, but not for the trebled damages. 28 Additionally, the court
attributed liability for the damages for loss of solatium solely to the Republic of Iraq. 129
While calculating economic losses was straightforward based on
calculations of future expected earnings under traditional theories of tort
recovery, calculating damages for pain and suffering was much less precise
due to the highly unusual and largely unknown details of each of the decedents' deaths. 130 The court distinguished between the deaths of Smith and
Soulas, explaining that given the uncertainty of when Smith died and the
extent of the pain and suffering, if any, that he endured, an award of $1
13
million
was appropriate.
With respect
to Soulas,
was
direct evidence
that he had survived
the plane's
impact,forthewhom
court there
explained

niary loss and pain and suffering) with Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *22-*39 (including
solatium damages in damages analysis).
124 See Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 232-40.
121 See id. at 240. The court distinguished between damages recoverable against Al
Qaeda under the ATA and those recoverable against Iraq under the Flatlow Amendment.
See id.
126 See id. The court explained that to the extent that the ATA's treble damages provisions already provides a penalty, the court was precluded from assessing additional punitive
damages against the Al Qaeda defendants. See id.
127 See Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d. at 220-31. The court appropriately analyzed the claims
against the Al Qaeda defendants under the ATA and the claims against the Iraqi Defendants
under FSIA. See id.
128 See id. at 240-41.
The court explained that 28 USC § 1606 immunizes foreign
states from liability for punitive damages. See id. at 240 (citing Elahi v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 113-114, 113 n. 17 (D.D.C. 2000)).
129 See Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d
at 240-41.
' See id. at 233 ("The effort after a tragedy of this nature to calculate pain and
suffering is difficult at best.. .The devastation and horror accompanying this trag-

edy makes a realistic appraisal almost impossible.").
131

See id. at 233-34.
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that the "ensuing time must have been psychologically excruciating" and
his death "very painful," and, therefore awarded $2.5 million as an appropriate measure of damages. 132
The end result was that Al Qaeda and the Republic of Iraq were
jointly and severally liable for approximately $20,250,000 in damages for
economic loss and pain and suffering, while Al Qaeda was liable for approximately $40,500,000 more for trebling and
the Republic of Iraq was
33
liable for $43,750,000 for solatium damages. 1
Soon after the court awarded damages in Smith, the Ungarcourt entered judgment awarding damages to the plaintiffs in that case.134 While
recognizing the Smith court's interpretation of damages allowable under
the ATA, the Ungar court highlighted the lack of clarity in the ATA's
damages clause 35 and noted that the Smith court's decision was of "limited
assistance" in addressing the issue because of the lack of discussion as to
how the court actually determined damages. 136 Because the plaintiffs, who
included surviving family members of the victims, were seeking damages
for both pecuniary and non-economic losses, including loss of companionship and society and mental anguish, or so-called "solatium damages," the
court was required to determine whether the statute provided for recovery
of damages for such losses. 137 To find the answer the court relied on the
legislative history of the ATA. 138 The court reasoned that because Congress expressly intended to empower victims "with all the weapons available in civil litigation,"' 39 Congress must have fittingly intended that the
"full range of damages" be available to those entitled to bring actions under the statute.14 The court also reasoned that allowing for solatium damages beyond pure economic losses followed recent nationwide legislative
tendencies. 141 The court, therefore, analyzed the damages suffered by the
plaintiffs in both economic and non-economic terms. 142
132 Id.

at 238-39.

' See id. at 240-41.

See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *7.
See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *22. The court pointed out that the ATA fails to
define "survivors" or "heirs" and that the lack of these definitions was problematic because
those terms are usually defined or determined by state law. Id. at *25. As the court noted:
"The measure of damages for causing the death of another depends on the wording of the
statute creating the right of action and its interpretation." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFTORTS § 925 (1979)).
136 Id. at *22-26.
137 See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *25.
138 See id. at *26.
-'
135

139 See id. (citing AntiterrorismAct of 1990: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. & Judicial Admin. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 10

(1992)).
140

Id.

41 See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *26.

The court quoted Prosser & Keeton on

Torts: "Though recovery for loss of society and comfort is denied under some statutes, it is
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2. Parties Eligible to Recover
The Ungar court also addressed the fundamental question of who
could properly recover damages in a suit brought pursuant to Section
2333.143 The court explained that because the term "survivors" was not
defined in § 2333(a) and the pleadings failed to indicate whether the victim's parents and siblings brought the action as survivors, the court was
forced to determine whether the parents and siblings of a decedent who
died leaving children are "survivors" within the meaning of the statute.'JA
Given the variability of the meaning of the terms, the court again resorted
to the legislative history of the statute for assistance in interpreting it.145
The legislative history indicated that Congress intended to broadly apply
theories of recovery generally accepted under traditional tort law. 146 After
a comprehensive review of the legislative history of the statute, the court
determined that Congress had clearly considered the issue of who could
bring suit under the ATA and intended the class to include "family members who are not legal heirs (such as the parents and siblings of a decedent
who leaves children)."'147 The court further reasoned that if this were not
an item usually recognized and made the basis for an award.. .Even jurisdictions that have
rejected the loss of society or consortium claim, as such, have permitted on form of it,
namely a loss of guidance and advice that the decedent would have provided." i. (quoting
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 127 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (footnotes

omitted)).

142See Ungar,2004 WL 134034, at *28-*37.
143 See id. at *22.
'44 See

id.
See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *24. The court compared Black's Law Dictionarv's broad definition of "survivor" as "[olne who survives another; one who lives beyond
some happening; one of two or more persons who lives after the death of the other or others," with a number of state statutes that specifically and narrowly define "survivors." See
id. at *23.
14',See id. at 24 (citing Boin, 291 F.3d at 1010). In Boim, the court explained: "[the
legislative] history.. .evidences an intent by Congress to codify general common law tort
principles and to extend civil liability for acts of international terrorism to the full reaches
145

of traditional tort law." 291 F.3d at 1010 (citing 137 Cong. Rec. S4511-04 (Apr. 16 1991))

("The [antiterrorism act] accords victims of terrorism the remedies of American tort law.");
see also Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Courts and Admin.

Practice of Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1990) (hereinafter "Senate Hearing") ("[T]he bill as drafted is powerfully broad,
and its intention ...
is to ...
bring [in] all of the substantive law of the American tort
law system.").
147 Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *25.
As originally drafted, the ATA allowed
compensation only for "any national of the United States...." Id. at *24 (citing
Senate Hearing at 8). The Justice Department recommended that Congress modify
the statute to explicitly allow suits by the family members as "survivors" and
"heirs" of the victim. See id. (citing Senate Hearing at 38). In a statement to the
Senate Subcommittee, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steven R. Valentine
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the case, there would have been no reason to include the term "survivors"
in the language of the statute. 4 The court, therefore, held that the term as
used in Section 2333(a) includes the parents and siblings of a U.S. national
killed by an act of international terrorism. 149
Accordingly, the Ungar court proceeded to calculate the damages
due to the various plaintiffs under the default judgment and arrived at an
award that compensated Ungar's children, parents, and siblings for economic damages, such as lost wages, and non-economic damages, such 15as0
loss of companionship, loss of society and guidance and mental anguish.

proposed: "that this provision be amended to include, in addition to the individual
directly affected, such additional parties as the estate of the decedent, survivors,
and heirs. This will ensure that the bill is fully protective of the interests of all
relevant parties to the civil suit." Id. In response to a question from Senator
Thurmond as to whether such a change was needed in order to ensure family
members the ability to file a lawsuit on behalf of a slain or injured relative, Mr.
Lloyd Green, counselor to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil
Division, responded: "It would make clear that which is already implied in the
bill. It would remove any doubt that anyone would have as to whether or not they
could bring the litigation." Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *25 (citing Senate Hearing
at 46). Mr. Valentine also expressed the Department of Justice's position on the legislation: "The Department supports legislation to provide a new civil remedy against terrorists
and a federal forum for the families and relatives of victims to pursue claims for compensatory damages." Id. (citing Senate Hearing). Consequently, Congress accepted the recommendation and modified the language to create a cause of action for "[ainy
national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by
reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or
heirs....IId. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2002)).
141See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *25.
149 See id. Pointing out that the surviving Ungar children were not U.S. citizens, the
court explained that Section 2333(a) contains no requirement that the survivors or heirs of a
U.S. national killed by an act of terrorism be U.S. citizens themselves and refused to read
such a requirement into the statute. See id. at *31.
1So See id. at *25-*37. The court recommended the following awards:
Estate of Yaron Ungar: $1,432,158 for lost earnings; $1,500,000 for pain and
suffering;
Divir Ungar (son): $30 million for loss of companionship, society. and guidance
and mental anguish; $488,482.50 for loss of parental services;
Yishai Ungar (son): $30 million for loss of companionship, society, and guidance
and mental anguish; $488,482.50 for loss of parental services;
Judith Ungar (mother): $15 million for loss of society and companionship and
mental anguish;
Meir Ungar: $15 million for loss of society and companionship and mental
aguish;
Michal Cohen: $7.5 million for loss of society and companionship and mental
anguish;
Amichai Ungar: $7.5 million for loss of society and companionship and mental
anguish;
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The court recommended damages totaling $1 16,409,123, plus interest and
attorney's fees.151 While the court analyzed the claims for damages as it
would in any other wrongful death suit, of note was the following statement of the court: "Given that [Ungar's sons] have been deprived of the
companionship of their father for approximately fifty years, including virtually all of their childhood, and that they will eventually know that their
father died a bloody and' painful
death at the hands of terrorists, a substan52
tial award is warranted."'
The court's focus on the heinous nature of the terrorist attack and
the substantial monetary damages which it awarded suggest that courts
may take a very liberal approach to calculating damages due to victims of
terrorism under the ATA. The more practical problem for plaintiffs, however, is enforcing those judgments. While a favorable judgment may be
satisfying, without assets against which the judgment can be executed, it is
nothing more than a piece of paper.
3. Enforcing Judgments
Private terrorist groups may have precious few tangible assets. The
very idea behind terrorism is that it allows relatively small, unsophisticated
groups with limited resources to wage a war with a fraction of the human
and financial resources of conventional military forces. As a result, terrorist groups will not often have the same liquid assets as would, for example,
a foreign government. Also, due to the illicit nature of the activities of
terrorist groups, even when they have substantial assets, they are likely to
be well hidden. 53 Locating
and securing these assets may, therefore, be
54
extremely difficult.'
Moreover, in the case that an identifiable terrorist organization has
substantial assets that can be secured, there is a strong possibility that the
United States government may have identified, frozen, and even confisDafna Ungar: $7.5 million for loss of society and companionship and mental anguish.
See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *38.
151See id. at *39. The court cited the special challenges that the litigation presented

and the high caliber of the work performed by plaintiffs' counsel when it awarded approximately $65,000 in attorney's fees at a higher hourly rate of compensations than it traditionally approved. See id. The District Court accepted the Magistrate Judge's recommenda-

tions on all aspects of the award, except for the allowance for prejudgment interest. See id.
at *7; see also supra note 62.
152 See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *34.
153 See lias Bantekas, The International Law of Terrorist Financing,97 AM. J.INT'L
L. 315, 317-21 (2003) (distinguishing lawful and unlawful sources of terrorist funds).
'- See Stephen C. Warneck, A Preemptive Strike: Using RICO and the AEDPA to
Attack the Financial Strength of International Terrorist Organizations, 78 B.U. L. REV.

177, 220 (1998) (discussing difficulty of finding terrorist assets).
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cated these assets. Under the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA), the President is authorized to block any property subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, with two conditions: 1) the President
may only exercise his power under IEEPA "to deal with an unusual and
extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been
declared"; and 2) the President may only block "property in which any
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest." '5
If the federal
government has frozen the terrorist assets, they may be available to secure
a money judgment for victims of terrorism.156
If, however, the President
has exercised his authority to confiscate the assets, as President Bush did
with all of Iraq's
frozen assets, the assets will not be obtainable by success57
ful plaintiffs. 1
The plaintiffs in Smith confronted this challenge in attempting to
satisfy a portion their $104 million judgment against defendants, including
Iraq, and were unsuccessful in their bid for an execution against Iraqi assets frozen and later confiscated by the federal government.158 In Smith v.
FederalReserve Bank of New York, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit upheld the federal government's power to confiscate
Iraqi assets and prevent them from being used to satisfy civil judgments
despite statutory provisions providing for the availability of blocked funds
to satisfy judgments against terrorist parties. 159
The plaintiffs in Smith sought to attach Iraqi assets held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which then-president George H.W. Bush
froze in 1990 in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, in satisfaction of
the $63.5 million of their judgment attributable to Iraq.'60 In response to
the recent war with Iraq, however, President George W. Bush relied on his
expanded power under the USA PATRIOT Act to actually confiscate Iraqi
assets that were previously frozen. 161 The plaintiffs sought to execute
15' 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2002).
156 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), Pub. L. No. 107-297, 166 Stat.
2322 (2002). See generally Jill M. Marks, Annotation, Construction and Application of §
201 of Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Public Law 107-297, § 20, 116 Stat. 2337,
190 A.L.R. FED. 155 (2003); Sean D. Murphy, Terrorist-State Litigation in 2002-03, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 966(2003). If a person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a
claim based upon an act of terrorism, any blocked assets (assets frozen or seized by the
United States) of the terrorist party are subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution to satisfy the judgment obtained. See id. The judgment may be against a terrorist party
or organization, or a terrorist state. See id.
157 See Exec. Order No. 13,920, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,307 (Mar. 20, 2003) ("All blocked
funds held in the United States in accounts in the name of [Iraq and its agents] are hereby
confiscated and vested in the Department of the Treasury.").
1S8 See Smith v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 346 F.3d 264 (2nd Cir. 2003).
i at 272.
id.
6
d. at 265-267.
161 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required

to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §
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judgment against those assets pursuant to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
of 2002 (TRIA). 162 The court ruled, however, that because the President
was within his authority conferred by IEEPA, as amended by the USA
PATRIOT Act, in confiscating the blocked Iraqi assets prior to the plaintiffs' judgment against Iraq, the President had vested title in the confiscated
assets and there were no more "blocked assets" against which the plaintiffs
could execute. 63 The court concluded with the following heartfelt, but
hollow, acknowledgment:
We readily acknowledge the importance of satisfying judgments in all cases. The horrific context of the matter at hand
with the loss of life and its tragic consequences only underscores that imperative. Nothing we do here abrogates that
judgment. We determine only that Plaintiffs must look elsewhere to satisfy it. 164
While the above decision dealt with judgments against foreign
states, as opposed to non-state terrorist actors, the court in Ungar very recently highlighted concerns that a similar situation may develop with respect to private assets if plaintiffs do not act quickly. 65 The court explained that the plaintiffs motion to enter a default judgment "must be
granted because the limited pool of Hamas assets against which Plaintiffs
may execute is steadily depleting."' 66 The court noted that because President Bush has designated Hamas a terrorist organization and blocked its
assets, it is unlikely that Hamas will bring any new assets into the United
States.1 7 Citing strong evidence that HLF operated as a fundraiser for
Hamas in the United States, and therefore, was an agency or instrumentality of Hamas, the court also concluded that any of HLF's blocked assets
could be subject to attachment and execution under TRIA. 68 The court
noted, however, that HLF's assets are steadily depleting because the
Treasury Department has allowed HLF to use its assets to challenge the
106, (Oct. 26, 2001). In 2001 Congress amended 50 U.S.C. § 1702 to grant the President

additional authority "when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities," to "confiscate
any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the Unites States, of any foreign person, foreign
organization, or foreign country that he determines has planned, authorized, aided or engaged in...hostilities or attacks against the United States..." 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C).
Under this provision, actual title to the assets vests in the federal government through the
President's designee. See id.

See Smith, 346 F.3d at 271-272; see also Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
(TRIA) supra note 156.
163 See Smith, 346 F.3d at 272.
164See id.
165See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *6-*7.
166Id. at *6.
167See id. at *7.
168See id. at *6-*7.
162
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blocking order as well as pending civil suits. 169 The court concluded that
because the blocked assets of HLF and Hamas may be the sole source from
which the plaintiffs can satisfy the court's judgment, "[w]hen the HLF
and/or Hamas fully deplete these assets, this Court's judgment against
Hamas will likely become a dead letter."'170 Such a result would defeat
Congress' clear intent that the ATA deter terrorist acts through the enforcement of judgments in these types of actions. '71
Thus, despite statutory provisions allowing for the release of assets
to satisfy civil judgments for victims of terrorism, victims may have to
"look elsewhere" or else the judgments they receive may become "dead
letters." The fundamental problem, however, is that there are not many
other places to look.
IV. CONCLUSION
As a tool to cripple terrorism and compensate victims, the ATA has
cast a wide net, but yielded a modest catch. The ideal defendant in a suit
brought under the ATA is an identifiable non-state terrorist group that has
committed an act of international terrorism, has significant assets, has continuous contacts with the United States, is amenable to service, and will not
have its assets subject to confiscation by the federal government. Clearly,
such an ideal candidate is hard to come by.
Suits are nonetheless likely to continue; and certain benefits and
drawbacks will certainly follow from the prosecution of claims under the
ATA. First off, the primary purpose of any damages claim, to allow an
opportunity for plaintiffs to be compensated for a loss, is promoted through
an enforceable judgment pursuant to the ATA. Victims and survivors of
terrorist acts can be compensated by those who are most culpable for the
victimization. Even when unenforceable judgments are rendered, however, victims are able to have their day in court and to establish liability.
This can be a crucial part of the healing process outside of monetary compensation. But given the slim chances for enforceable judgments, some
may question whether it is wise to expend limited judicial resources chasing such elusive rewards. The same hope and consolation that pursuing
claims might bring for victims may also be routinely crushed by the inability to secure an enforceable judgment. The benefits and barriers to bringing suits should be seriously weighed, especially if it will be more often
than not an exercise of "going through the motions" with no tangible result.

169
170

See Ungar, 2004 WL 134034, at *7.
i.

1 See id.
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Another benefit is the continued refinement of international law
with respect to civil liability in the context of terrorism. As terrorism continues to pervade the international arena as a mode of political and cultural
conflict, dealing with the social impact of terrorist acts through civil justice
will be an evolving issue of international law. Because there is little
precedent thus far for civil actions against terrorists in the United States,
the cases that do come before the courts will have important precedential
value in setting the stage for future litigation. The concomitant problem
may be that private individuals will be seen as meddling in foreign affairs,
a delicate arena in which the Executive Branch has an interest in preventing the involvement of citizens and the Judiciary. The competing interests
of the government's War on Terrorism and plaintiffs' claims against terrorists with respect to the disposition of terrorist assets may place the government and citizen plaintiffs in divergent positions.
Having victims and survivors of terrorism join the class of individuals seeking to find and hold terrorists and their supporters responsible may,
however, add to the mounting pressure upon them and further inhibit their
ability to avoid criminal or civil prosecution. Motivated by notions of justice and economic compensation, plaintiffs may pour resources toward
finding and seizing terrorist assets, which may bolster the ongoing government efforts to do the same. The ATA has the potential to create "private attorneys general" empowered to find and rout out terrorists, which
may, in turn, allow the government to harness private resources to aid its
efforts.
Moreover, the burden of establishing civil liability against those
persons or groups who directly or indirectly support terrorism may be easier to meet than the burden of proving criminal liability. In some cases,
once liability is established, attaching assets already in the United States
may be a more feasible task than locating and apprehending the individual
perpetrators for criminal prosecution. While enforcement of civil law does
not bring with it the same set of powerful tools, as does enforcement of
criminal laws, pursuing civil claims certainly adds some new tools to society's arsenal to fight terrorism. Aggressively pursuing the financial assets
that sustain terrorism on both civil and criminal fronts may tighten the
stranglehold on terrorism. At the same time, if the scope of liability for
supporting terrorism expands, legitimate non-profit, religious, and cultural
organizations may find themselves facing mounting claims for liability for
terrorist acts that they truly do not support. The possibility of civil "witchhunts," motivated by desires to hold non-culpable parties with assets responsible for terrorist acts should be guarded against.
Overall, while there are problems and challenges inherent to bringing successful suits, the ATA is not altogether without teeth. Suits against
defendants such as the PLO and Hamas hold promise for some form of
plaintiff recovery. In addition, the potential expansion of liability under
the ATA to those who aid and abet international terrorism through the pro-
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vision of material support expands the pool of deep-pocketed parties who
contribute to the complex financial infrastructure of terrorist networks and
thereby subject themselves to liability. Finally, given the liberal calculation of damages recoverable and parties entitled to recovery, if and when
an enforceable judgment is rendered, it is likely to have the financially
crippling impact that the ATA intends. As the War on Terrorism persists,
more potential defendants may be uncovered, while increasingly more assets may be cordoned off from judicial attachment by the federal government's authority to confiscate such assets. With further judicial interpretation and continued advocacy on behalf of victims of terrorism, the net may
be tightened, but with very few cases so far, that catch remains to be seen.
Seth N. Stratton

